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Simple as they may seem, the two sections treating negligent
infliction of emotional distress in the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm mark a significant
juncture in tort law. The recognition of recovery for stand-alone
emotional distress is proof that the ground has shifted from earlier
times when the tort was approached with extreme skepticism. As I
see it, sections 46 and 47 reframe the central question in this area
from whether to provide compensation for negligently inflicted
emotional distress to when to provide such compensation. In this
fast-developing area of law, the most crucial task for courts is to
identify those particular contexts in which genuine emotional
distress suffered by victims is so compelling that it deserves
recognition in law. This Article focuses on two such special contexts:
cases involving sexual exploitation and cases involving reproductive
injury.'
As the Restatement (Third) documents, courts have repeatedly
confronted sexual and reproductive issues in emotional-distress2
cases, even if they rarely see the larger picture or reflect on their
social significance. In this Article, I make an argument for
prioritizing plaintiffs' interests in sexual integrity and reproduction
as interests worthy of heightened protection through the imposition
of a duty of due care under the tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress. As yet, the new sections in the Restatement
(Third) do not explicitly take this step, but they are certainly
* Robert J. Lynn Chair in Law, The Ohio State University. I would like
to thank Barbara Schwabauer for her excellent research assistance.
1. Although this Article does not address bystander cases involving harm
to intimate family members, the topic also fits within my proposed framework
for prioritizing claims involving fundamental rights and interests. For a
discussion of bystander claims using this framework, see MARTHA CHAMALLAS &
JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER AND TORT LAW
(forthcoming 2010).
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 45 reporters' note cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007).
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flexible enough to encourage courts to do so.
The stakes associated with identifying these special contexts
are high, particularly for women. The dichotomy that tort law has
traditionally drawn between physical harm and emotional harm is
not simply a system of classification of contrasting interests, but a
hierarchy of values that privileges physical injury over emotional
and relational harm. Although the special restrictions governing
emotional harm are stated in gender-neutral terms, as they operate
in social context, they have a significant gender impact. Simply
stated, restrictions on recovery for emotional harm tend to place
women at a disadvantage because important and recurring injuries
in women's lives are more often classified as lower-ranked emotional
or relational harms. To be clear, the gender dynamic in these cases
is not that of favoring individual female plaintiffs over individual
male plaintiffs. Rather, the gender disadvantage flows from
disfavoring the types of claims that female plaintiffs are likely to
bring, placing them-and any male plaintiffs bringing similar
claims-at a structural disadvantage. Thus, I approach negligent-
infliction claims arising from sexual exploitation and reproductive
injury as gender-related claims, even though tort doctrine is
formally gender-neutral.
I mentioned that courts and commentators do not often notice
that negligent-infliction cases center on these gender-inflected
issues. Instead, the sexual exploitation dimension of the cases-and
to a lesser degree, the reproductive dimension-is most prominent
in claims brought for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In
deciding which conduct should be regarded as "extreme and
outrageous," courts are routinely called upon to judge the conduct of
sexual harassers, stalkers, and abusive defendants who
intentionally cause their victims to miscarry or suffer other forms of
reproductive harm. It is striking that in the commentary to section
45 of the Restatement (Third), governing the intentional-infliction
tort, ten out of the thirteen illustrations deal with misconduct
implicating sexual or reproductive behavior, ranging from a
stepfather who sexually abuses his stepdaughter, to the
inappropriate touching of a preschooler, to a police officer who stalks
a woman with whom he is obsessed . These illustrations track the
contours of the contemporary intentional-infliction tort, which to a
large degree has become identified with discrimination and
harassment as well as abuse and exploitation in intimate
3. Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort
Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 490 (1998); Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber,
Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 814
(1990).
4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 45 cmt. b, illus. 3; cmt. c, illus. 4-5; cmt. h, illus. 6-9; cmt. i, illus. 10-11; cmt.




I see an important continuity in many negligent-infliction cases
and detect a similar preoccupation with sexual exploitation and
reproductive issues. At the outset, let me note that I am not here
referring to negligent-infliction cases arising out of threatened
physical harm-the near-miss cases or the "fear of' disease and
exposure cases, now covered under section 46(a).6 In this genre of
cases, which is still quite closely tied to the risk of physical injury,
there is no gender dimension or disparate gender impact.
Instead, I am concentrating on those cases that fall under
section 46(b).8 This controversial slice of negligent-infliction cases
involves distress arising from damaged and abusive human
relationships and most resembles the kinds of deeply personal
interests at stake in intentional-infliction cases. To borrow
terminology from constitutional law, these are the cases that
implicate fundamental rights of sexual autonomy, reproductive
choice, and intimate family relationships. They typically are
saturated with gender and implicate gender roles, sexual integrity,
and personal identity.
To give just a flavor of the case law, many of these negligent-
infliction cases involve allegations of sexual exploitation, in and
outside the workplace. Take, for example, a notable Texas case in
which the plaintiffs boyfriend, with the aid of his pals, cooked up a
scheme to secretly videotape the teenage couple having sex and then
showed the tape to others on several occasions; 9 or the case
involving a psychologist who had sex with his patient "under the
guise of therapy";' or the claim against a mental-health facility for
failing to prevent an employee from having sex with and
impregnating a mentally ill patient;" or the scores of cases against
employers for failing to prevent sexual harassment of their
employees.12
A large number of this genre of negligent-infliction cases also
involve claims arising in the reproductive context. There are
5. See generally Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The
Migration from Civil Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2115 (2007).
6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 46 cmt. h (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007).
7. See DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO
ACCOMPANY TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 752 (5th ed. 2005) (Teacher's Manual) (arguing that
the zone-of-danger rule is really a physical-risk rule).
8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 46(b) (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007).
9. Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993).
10. Corgan v. Muehling, 574 N.E.2d 602, 603 (Ill. 1991).
11. Doe v. Senechal, 845 N.E.2d 418 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006).
12. See, e.g., Burns v. Mayer, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (D. Nev. 2001); Mukaida
v. Hawaii, 159 F. Supp. 2d 1211 (D. Haw. 2001); Knox v. Combined Ins. Co. of
Am., 542 A.2d 363 (Me. 1988).
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negligent-infliction claims by women who suffer emotional distress
resulting from stillbirths, miscarriages, and sterilizations caused by
physician negligence; 13 there are claims by couples who sue fertility
clinics for losing the sperm of a man about to undergo
chemotherapy,'4 or for negligently mixing up sperm so that a child is
conceived from a source other than the designated donor. '
5
Numerous claims also arise shortly after a child is born: cases
involving a newborn who is abducted from the hospital or who is
switched at birth with another infant. 16 A poignant recent case
involved the negligence of a hospital employee who brought a one-
day-old baby to a mother for breastfeeding, failed to see that the
mother was heavily sedated, and left the two alone.' The infant
was tragically smothered to death when the mother fell asleep on
top of him. 8 In this category of negligent-infliction/reproductive-
harm cases also belong claims of "wrongful birth," which are
typically brought against physicians who negligently fail to advise
their patients about the risks of giving birth to a child with serious
disabilities. 19
I. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) SECTION 46(b)
As I describe these cases, it is evident that tort law has come a
long way from the day when recovery was permitted only for
mishandling corpses and negligently transmitting death telegrams,
the old precursors of liability for this strand of negligence law. 20As
the Restatement (Third) recognizes, there is presently a need to
articulate more general rules of liability that bring together the
13. See Robinson v. Cutchin, 140 F. Supp. 2d 488 (D. Md. 2001)
(sterilization); Oswald v. LeGrand, 453 N.W.2d 634 (Iowa 1990) (miscarriage);
Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 809 N.E.2d 645 (N.Y. 2004) (stillbirth).
14. See Baskette v. Atlanta Ctr. for Reprod. Med., LLC, 648 S.E.2d 100 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2007).
15. See Andrews v. Keltz, 838 N.Y.S.2d. 363 (Sup. Ct. 2007); Harnicher v.
Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67 (Utah 1998). For a discussion of the mix-
up cases, see Leslie Bender, "To Err is Human" ART Mix-ups: A Labor-Based,
Relational Proposal, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 443 (2006).
16. See, e.g., Johnson v. Jam. Hosp., 467 N.E.2d 502 (N.Y. 1984) (infant
abducted from hospital); Larsen v. Banner Health Sys., 81 P.3d 196 (Wyo. 2003)
(infant switched at birth).
17. See Garcia v. Lawrence Hosp., 773 N.Y.S.2d 59 (App. Div. 2004).
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d
557 (Ga. 1990); Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1988); Smith v. Cote,
513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); Becker v.
Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 337
S.E.2d 528 (1985).
20. See, e.g., Christensen v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 181 (Cal. 1991)
(negligent handling of decedent's remains); Young v. W. Union Tel. Co., 107
N.C. 370, 11 S.E. 1044 (1890) (negligent failure to deliver death telegram);
Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, Inc., 327 S.E.2d 438 (W. Va. 1985)
(mishandling of dead bodies).
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disparate strands of negligent-infliction cases decided in the last few
decades. Section 46(b) of the Restatement (Third) purports to
synthesize and deal with these cases by authorizing liability if the
conduct producing the distress "occurs in the course of specified
categories of activities, undertakings, or relationships in which
negligent conduct is especially likely to cause serious emotional
disturbance .,,2 The section thus anticipates a prioritizing of
contexts and types of cases. Significantly, however, the Restatement
(Third) does not express an opinion as to which specific activities,
undertakings, or relationships give rise to liability, providing only
that they be of a kind likely to produce serious emotional injury.22
The crucial work of identifying specific contexts is left to future
courts.
Although at first blush section 46(b) may seem noncommittal,
and for that reason inconsequential, I regard it as the most
important subsection relating to the negligent-infliction tort. The
Restatement (Third)'s emphasis on the concrete relational context in
which the tort is committed and away from basing recovery solely on
the categorization of the injury (or some other arbitrary conceptual
line) marks an important development, especially if it influences the
development of future case law.
The way I look at it, section 46(b) clears away a lot of debris. It
rejects the "physical manifestation" requirement that has been
imposed by many courts,23 that stepchild of the old impact rule that
required proof of physicality of the injury, even in cases in which it
was clear that the plaintiffs emotional distress was severe and was• 24
not unreasonable under the circumstances. In this respect, section
46(b) finally severs the link between recovery for emotional distress
resulting from negligence in relationships and very dissimilar
conduct that produces a threat of physical harm. Section 46(b) also
performs a service by rejecting the highly abstract and confusing
"independent duty" requirement that some courts have used as they
scrambled for a doctrinal peg from which to hang recovery.25
The key unresolved question is how courts will go about
specifying the classes of activities, undertakings, or relationships
21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 46(b) (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007).
22. See id. § 46 cmt. f.
23. See, e.g., Culpepper v. Pearl St. Bldg., Inc., 877 P.2d 877, 880 n.3 (Colo.
1994) (recovering for negligent infliction of emotional distress requires the
plaintiff to suffer "serious physical manifestations or mental illness"); accord
Reynolds v. Highland Manor, Inc., 954 P.2d 11, 13 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998);
O'Donnell v. HCA Health Servs., 883 A.2d 319, 324 (N.H. 2005); Reilly v.
United States, 547 A.2d 894, 895 (R.I. 1988) (citing D'Ambra v. United States,
338 A.2d 524, 531 (R.I. 1975)).
24. See, e.g., Reilly, 547 A.2d at 895 (citing D'Ambra, 338 A.2d at 531).
25. See, e.g., Clomon v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 572 So. 2d 571, 575 (La.
1990); Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. 1993).
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that trigger a duty of care under section 46(b). In the past, some
courts have limited recovery solely to cases in which the plaintiff
and the defendant were in a preexisting contractual relationship.26
These courts essentially treated this strand of negligent infliction as
an appendage to contract law, providing recovery only in that
special subset of contracts in which emotional distress was highly
predictable, given the delicate nature of the contractual
undertaking. In some of these cases, moreover, it has been stated
that the contract supplies the "independent duty" towards the
plaintiff that justifies protection against emotional distress. 7
The contract limitation does capture many of the cases I
described above-particularly those involving interference with
reproduction-which frequently occur in the context of the
doctor/patient relationship. It also potentially permits employees
who claim that their employers have negligently failed to protect
them from sexual harassment to sue for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.
However, envisioning the tort as an expansion of contract rights
suggests that the primary interest at stake is bolstering and
enforcing the parties' voluntary agreement-that is, the general
interest in private ordering protected by contract. By foregrounding
contract in this way, the exclusive source of the duty for the
negligent-infliction tort becomes private undertakings, rather than
social or constitutional norms or public policy. In my view, this
conceptualization of the tort misses a key dimension of so many of
the cases-their clear link to intimate human relationships and
personal interests unrelated to contract. A critical feature of this
strand of negligent-infliction cases is that the defendant's conduct
often damages a plaintiffs well-being in noncommercial contexts
central to her identity as a woman, mother, or family member.
Additionally, women's control over their sexuality and their
decisions about bearing and nurturing children are often at stake.
II. SEXUAL EXPLOITATION CASES
Two contrasting sexual exploitation cases demonstrate why
courts should reject the contract and independent-duty limitations
on liability and should explicitly prioritize the plaintiffs interest in
sexual autonomy as triggering a duty of due care under section
46(b). The first case is Boyles v. Kerr, the previously mentioned
1993 Texas Supreme Court case involving the boyfriend who, along
with his friends, surreptitiously videotaped the teenage plaintiff
having sex with him. 2' Before the taping, the friends set the stage
for the video by taping "themselves making crude comments and
26. See, e.g., Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 203 (Alaska 1995); Larsen v.
Banner Health Sys., 81 P.3d 196, 203 (Wyo. 2003).
27. See, e.g., Larsen, 81 P.3d at 202-03.
28. Boyles, 855 S.W.2d 593.
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jokes about the activity that was to follow." 29 After the taping, the
boyfriend took possession of the video and showed it to ten other
people, purportedly even benefitting financially from one viewing.
The video was eventually widely gossiped about at the college
campuses the plaintiff and her then ex-boyfriend attended. The
plaintiff found out about the tape four months after the event, when
she discovered that she was becoming known as the "porno queen"
among her classmates. °
The woman sued her ex-boyfriend and the others involved in the
scheme, asserting a variety of legal theories.3 ' The trial focused,
however, primarily on the claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress, the theory that most readily reached the behavior of all of
the defendants and would presumably have allowed the plaintiff to
tap into the homeowners' insurance policies of the defendants'
parents, which covered negligence, but not intentional injury.32 The
plaintiff was successful in the lower courts: she secured a jury
verdict of $1,000,000 for compensatory and punitive damages for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, which the appellate court
affirmed.33
Boyles was a rare case in which gender bubbled up to the
surface and stimulated a debate about the gender dimension of the
negligent-infliction tort. By the time the case reached the Texas
Supreme Court, it had garnered considerable attention from
women's organizations, who submitted amicus briefs to the court
supporting the verdict and urging the court to recognize the claim
for negligent infliction in sexual abuse and exploitation cases. Amici
stressed that denying recovery in a case such as Boyles would send a
message to sexual abuse victims that they were "second class
citizens" and argued that "[i]t defies logic to have a system of justice
that will compensate the victim of a car wreck but that will refuse to
compensate the recipients of the most devastating of emotional
injuries. "34
The impassioned arguments, however, did not persuade the
majority of the court, which overturned the jury verdict and
29. Id. at 594.
30. Id.
31. Id. As injury, the plaintiff alleged that the events significantly
interfered with her ability to study and caused her severe emotional suffering
and humiliation, culminating in a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder.
Id. at 611 (Doggett, J., dissenting on reh'g).
32. Torts plaintiffs often "underlitigate" their cases, asserting only
negligence claims because of the basic exclusion for intentional harm in
standard liability policies. See Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories We Tell: Intentional
Harm and the Quest for Insurance Funding, 75 TEx. L. REV. 1721, 1722-23
(1997).
33. Boyles, 855 S.W.2d at 594-95.
34. Id. at 610 (Doggett, J., dissenting on reh'g) (quoting Brief for Women's
Advocacy Project as Amicus Curiae Urging Rehearing at ii-iii, Boyles, 855
S.W.2d 593 (No. D-0963)).
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declared that absent a finding of an independent duty, there could
be no recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress in
Texas.35  Tellingly, the court did not consider the special
relationship between intimate sexual partners sufficient to create a
duty. In a concurring opinion, Justice Alberto Gonzalez flatly
declared that "[t]his case has nothing to do with gender-based
discrimination or an assault on women's rights."36
The strong dissents in Boyles regarded the outcome in the case
as an injustice to "the women of Texas" and chided the majority for
treating what happened to the plaintiff as if it were "a mere trifle or
any other distress associated with daily existence. 37 In response to
the assertion that the case should have been litigated solely as an
intentional tort, Justice Doggett noted that in many cases, severe
emotional distress may be caused by an actor who does not desire to
inflict severe emotional distress and who may be oblivious to the fact
that such distress is substantially certain to result from his
actions.8 In Twyman v. Twyman, the companion case to Boyles, for
example, Justice Spector-the lone female justice on the Texas
Supreme Court-speculated that the boyfriend may have videotaped
the sexual intercourse with the plaintiff "not for the purpose of
injuring her, but rather for the purpose of amusing himself and his
friends."39 She was of the view that "[birutish behavior that causes
severe injury, even though unintentionally, should not be
trivialized." °
Justice Spector's dissent was notable for its take on the gender
dimension of the negligent-infliction tort. She emphasized that the
claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress was of special
significance to women because "the overwhelming majority of
emotional distress claims have arisen from harmful conduct by men,
rather than women."41 While recognizing that both men and women
could have an interest in recovery for emotional distress, she
expressed concern that, historically, "men have had a
disproportionate interest in downplaying such claims."42  For
Spector, the court's rejection of the negligent-infliction claim
represented "a step backward" in the law's response to the sexual
mistreatment of women and was "especially troubling" given the
high incidence of sexual harassment and domestic violence
35. Id. at 594 (majority opinion).
36. Id. at 604 (Gonzalez, J., concurring on reh'g).
37. Id. at 610 (Doggett, J., dissenting on reh'g); id. at 618 (DogL tt, J.,
dissenting).
38. Id. at 616 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
39. Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 644 (Tex. 1993) (Spector, J.,
dissenting).
40. Id.




throughout the country. 3
Boyles is a striking example of how tort law can miss the mark
when it lumps together all negligent-infliction cases without regard
to context. Rather than battle over whether there is a contract or an
independent duty upon which to base tort liability, I would argue
that cases such as Boyles should be resolved more concretely by
focusing on whether the defendant's conduct could be expected to
jeopardize the plaintiffs interest in sexual integrity and autonomy.
Because it was clear in Boyles that secretly videotaping the parties
and distributing the tape would reasonably be expected to (and did)
seriously erode plaintiffs control over her sexuality, a duty of due
care should have been triggered. Interestingly, all of the members
of the Texas Supreme Court seemed to regard the case as one of
unacceptable sexual exploitation, yet they disagreed as to whether
there was a duty of due care owed by the defendants.' Focusing
more directly on the interest at stake would have had the advantage
of delimiting the scope of the negligent-infliction claim without
downplaying the seriousness of the injury.
Perhaps most importantly, it is not enough to say that plaintiff
might have succeeded if only she had pursued a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress or intentional invasion of privacy.
Aside from the issue of availability of insurance, it is far from clear
that the conduct of all of the defendants in Boyles would be classified
as outrageous, particularly under the high threshold of proof Texas
courts have applied in intentional-infliction cases.45  Moreover,
placing a high priority on the plaintiffs interest in sexual integrity
and autonomy would mean that this interest would be regarded as
so important that it should be protected against negligent as well as
intentional interference.
Not all courts have been as reluctant to provide protection to
sexual exploitation victims through the negligent-infliction tort. In
1991 the Supreme Court of Illinois allowed a negligent-infliction
claim based on sexual exploitation to proceed to trial in Corgan v.
Mueling, a case involving an unregistered psychiatrist who had sex
with a patient "under the guise of therapy."46 After ending the
professional relationship, the former patient sued the therapist,
alleging both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress. The patient claimed that the sexual encounters were
shameful and humiliating to her and forced her to undergo more
extensive counseling and psychotherapeutic care.47 Perhaps because
43. Id. at 643.
44. Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 594, 602 (Tex. 1993); id. at 616
(Doggett, J., dissenting).
45. See Mae C. Quinn, Note, The Garden Path of Boyles v. Kerr and
Twyman v. Twyman An Outrageous Response to Victims of Sexual Misconduct,
4 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 247, 248 (1995).
46. Corgan v. Muehling, 574 N.E.2d 602, 603 (Ill. 1991).
47. Id. at 603-04.
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it was easy to think about this case as an instance of professional
malpractice, the allegations in the plaintiffs complaint focused on
the particular ways in which the therapist had failed to take due
care, mentioning his negligence in treating female patients when
"he was incapable of maintaining appropriate professional
objectivity," his allowing the relationship with the plaintiff "to
become a vehicle for the 'resolution of his own psychosexual
infirmities,"' and his failure to consult with other psychologists
when "he realized that his relationship with plaintiff was adverse to
her psychological well-being."
48
In ruling for the plaintiff, the majority of the court dispensed
with the need to demonstrate a "physical manifestation" of injury
and held that the therapist/patient relationship gave rise to a duty
of due care.' 9  The majority opinion discussed public policy,
highlighting the risks and harms of sexual exploitation and citing
recent legislation in the state and an article in a feminist journal
analyzing the exploitation of female patients."° In sharp contrast to
the Texas court, the Illinois court was not concerned that the case
might also have been framed and litigated as an intentional-tort
case. For the Illinois court, the extra measure of protection to an
abuse victim afforded by a negligence claim was regarded as an
appropriate legal response, given the gravity of the injury and the
relationship of the parties.5 '
It is important to note that the Corgan decision was not
unanimous and drew a stinging dissent from a member of the court
who had a very different idea of what constituted sexual exploitation
and what the proper legal response should be in such cases. The
dissent would have disallowed the claim, characterizing the case as
one of "mutually agreeable sexual intercourse" and concluding that
the moment the sexual relationship began, the treatment by
definition ended.5 2  Because the plaintiff was not "a minor...
mentally retarded or... under any other legal disability," the
dissenting justice refused to regard her submission to sexual
intercourse as sexual exploitation or sexual abuse.53 In the mind of
the dissenting justice, negligence liability should always be tied to
physical injury. He opined that this was not a proper negligence
case because "[tihere [was] no allegation that the parties fell off a
bed or injured any part of the plaintiffs anatomy. " 4
On display in Boyles and Corgan are two very different stances
48. Id. at 603 (citing plaintiffs complaint).
49. Id. at 605-06.
50. Id. at 607 (citing 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 140/1 (West 1989); Denise
Leboeuf, Note, Psychiatric Malpractice: Exploitation of Women Patients, 11
HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 83 (1988)).
51. Id. at 606.
52. Id. at 611 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 611-12.
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toward allegations of sexual exploitation in tort cases. The majority
in Corgan and the dissent in Boyles were greatly affected by the
context of the cases and used it to justify liberalizing the rules for
recovery of damages under the negligent-infliction tort.5 These
judges seemed to start from an assumption that sexual exploitation
was a serious societal problem and that tort law should respond to
such a public-policy concern. Although they stopped short of
declaring that plaintiffs should receive heighted protection in sexual
exploitation cases, they were aware of the importance of their
decisions to women's rights and sexual equality. In their opinions,
one can discern traces of the influence of feminist theorists-such as
Catharine MacKinnon-who have long argued for a transformation
of legal notions of consent and a greater appreciation of the severity
of the harm caused by sexual exploitation.5"
In contrast, the majority and concurrence in Boyles and the
dissent in Corgan thought it unnecessary and undesirable to expand
legal protection against sexual exploitation, particularly if it meant
exposing insurers to claims in such cases. Significantly, the
dissenter in Corgan clearly blamed the victim for her own
suffering.58 Although the justices in the Texas majority did not
condone the defendant's behavior, they were also careful to
downplay the significance of the parties' relationship and noted that
the plaintiff and defendant were "not dating steadily" but "had
shared several previous sexual encounters," suggesting perhaps that
the plaintiff was foolish to trust a sex partner under such
circumstances. 59 These judges saw no connection between recovery
for emotional distress and the larger cultural issues of gender
equality and preservation of women's sexual integrity.
Aside from the differing judicial attitudes toward sexual
exploitation, of course, Corgan can be distinguished from Boyles
because there was a preexisting contract for psychological treatment
in Corgan that was lacking in Boyles. In my view, however, this
difference should not be determinative and only highlights the
critical issue posed by such cases: namely, whether protection in tort
law from sexual exploitation should arise only when a contract
exists. I would argue that the more important consideration is that
in both cases the women were unjustifiably misled and exploited.
The teenage plaintiff in Boyles had as much right to expect that her
boyfriend would not tape their sexual intercourse for the
amusement of others as did the patient in Corgan to trust that her
55. Id. at 606-07 (majority opinion); Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 607
(Tex. 1993) (Doggett, J., dissenting on reh'g).
56. See, e.g., CATHARiNE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN's LivEs, MEN'S LAWS 240-
48 (2005).
57. See Corgan, 574 N.E.2d at 611-12 (Heiple, J., dissenting); Boyles, 855
S.W.2d at 600; id. at 605 (Gonzalez, J., concurring on reh'g).
58. Corgan, 574 N.E.2d at 611 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
59. Boyles, 855 S.W.2d at 594.
2009] 1119
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
therapist would not exploit her vulnerability to his sexual
advantage. Of fundamental importance is that these expectations
arise from normative standards of ethical behavior and decent
treatment, not from contract. Admittedly, like most cultural norms,
the norm against sexual exploitation is not universally accepted and
remains contested. Like the dissenting justice in Corgan, many
people still hold to the belief that unless sexual intercourse is
extracted through means of physical force or the threat of physical
force, it is socially acceptable and ought not to be subject to legal
sanctions. And there is no escaping the sometimes difficult question
of whether a particular defendant's conduct can fairly be
characterized as sexual exploitation or abuse. However, this is the
terrain over which such contests should be waged, rather than
deciding negligent-infliction cases on less central features, such as
whether a contract exists between the parties or whether the injury
manifests itself physically.
III. REPRODUCTIVE-HARM CASES
With respect to cases involving reproductive harm, where there
is most often a preexisting contractual doctor/patient relationship,
the tension in the case law has been whether to retain a "physical
injury" or "physical manifestation" requirement." In the
reproductive context, this inquiry is itself related to gender because
such cases often require courts to characterize the relationship
between a pregnant woman and her fetus. Many courts have had a
difficult time seeing and categorizing the physical and emotional
connection between mother and fetus. The intertwined physical and
emotional nature of the response of a woman who experiences a
miscarriage or stillbirth does not fit neatly into the standard
repertoire of injuries suffered by tort plaintiffs.
Only in 2004 did the Court of Appeals of New York finally
decide to allow a negligent-infliction claim by a woman who suffered
emotional distress at the stillbirth of her twins.6' In this case,
Broadnax v. Gonzalez, the woman's obstetrician had failed to
diagnose and treat her for a condition (incompetent cervix) that put
her pregnancy at risk.62 Prior to this case, New York courts had
clung to the "physical injury" rule and had insisted that a female
plaintiff demonstrate a physical injury to herself, "distinct from that
suffered by the fetus and not a normal incident of childbirth."6
60. Compare Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 809 N.E.2d 645, 647-48 (N.Y. 2004)
(explaining that the logic and reasoning for requiring a showing of physical
injury can no longer be defended), with Delgado v. Epstein, 2005 WL 3693200,
at *12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 24, 2006) (requiring a showing of physical
manifestation to recover).
61. Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 649.




Despite the existence of a doctor/patient relationship-which
presumably carries an expectation that the doctor will exercise
reasonable care to protect both the expectant mother and her
unborn child-the New York courts had looked for something more
before recognizing a duty and allowing recovery for the mother's
clearly foreseeable emotional distress. Importantly, New York had
also disallowed wrongful-death suits in such cases, leaving parents
entirely without a remedy. 6
This restrictive New York rule failed to comprehend a woman's
distinctive interest in reproduction that encompasses the period
during her pregnancy in which she and the fetus are linked
physically. To try to isolate a wholly separate injury to the
mother-and deny recovery when it is lacking-is a dramatic
example of refusing to recognize an injury because no identical harm
could be suffered by a man. Plaintiffs have long argued that it
should be enough to prove that medical treatment of a woman
during pregnancy is the kind of activity that, if handled negligently,
is highly likely to give rise to serious emotional injuries. In
Broadnax, the Court of Appeals of New York finally agreed,
acknowledging that "[b]ecause the health of the mother and fetus
are linked, we will not force them into legalistic pigeonholes." 5
Interestingly, some courts that have historically been reluctant
to allow claims for stand-alone emotional harm have been impelled
by the reproductive context of the claim to make an exception to the
denial of recovery. A 1990 decision by the Iowa Supreme Court is a
good example of judicial extension of the negligent-infliction claim to
protect a plaintiffs reproductive interests without stating so in
precise terms. In Oswald v. LeGrand,66 a woman five months
pregnant was horribly mistreated by nurses and doctors at the
emergency room of Mercy Hospital in Dubuque. Despite the
woman's extensive bleeding and cramping, the nurses chided her for
coming into the hospital, one even telling her that if she miscarried,
it would not be a baby but rather a "big blob of blood."67 One of the
doctors charged with treating the plaintiff was so eager to go on
vacation that he left the plaintiff in the hospital corridor, "hysterical
and insisting she was about to deliver," minutes before she actually
began delivering the baby in the hallway. 8 After the delivery, the
nurses and a doctor declared that the baby was stillborn and left the
infant on an instrument tray for nearly one half hour. Remarkably,
it was the baby's father who discovered that the infant was still
alive when the infant returned his grasp to her finger. After twelve
64. See, e.g., Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901, 906-07 (N.Y. 1969).
65. Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 648-49.
66. 453 N.W.2d 634 (Iowa 1990).
67. Id. at 636.
68. Id. at 637.
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hours in intensive care, however, the infant died.69
The negligent-infliction claim was crucial to this case because
the couple could not prove that the hospital's mistreatment of the
mother and infant somehow caused the infant's death or that the
infant would have survived longer if the medical care had been
otherwise. The court thus had to confront the question of whether
an emotional-distress claim could lie even absent a claim of physical
injury to the mother or the infant. Relying on the old cases
involving false death telegraphs and mishandling of corpses, the
court permitted recovery. It observed that the "life and death"
context of childbirth was comparable to the old cases, presumably
because both involved the "negligent performance of contractual
services that carry with them deeply emotional responses in the
event of breach."7 ° Under the circumstances, the court believed that
liability for emotional distress should also attach to the delivery of
medical services.7' The court's decision was thus quite sensitive to
context, even if it stopped short of declaring that the plaintiffs
interest in reproduction was a fundamental interest deserving of
heightened protection.
One reason that courts in torts cases alleging reproductive
harm are not quick to draw an analogy to constitutional-rights cases
asserting deprivation of procreative rights may be that the latter
generally involve the assertion of "negative" rights against
government interference, while tort claims most often involve the
assertion of "positive" rights against private defendants who fail to
protect plaintiffs' interests.72 This dilemma over duty is at the heart
of a larger cultural controversy about the scope of civil rights, with
progressives arguing for more expansive protection against harms
inflicted by private interests, while conservatives generally aim to
limit protection narrowly to abuses of official governmental power.
In the real world, of course, there is often no strict separation
between governmental power and private power, particularly for
low-income persons who are forced to rely on the government for
essential services such as medical care.
One prominent context in which constitutional claims for
deprivation of reproductive rights have merged with tort-like
allegations of lack of informed consent involves suits over the
sterilization of poor women who qualify for Medicaid. Several high-
profile lawsuits were brought in the early- and mid-1970s, often
alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Reconstruction-era
69. Id.
70. Id. at 639.
71. Id.
72. In wrongful-birth cases, however, courts have often cited to Roe v. Wade
and have discussed a woman's constitutional right to decide whether to
terminate a pregnancy. See Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 343-44 (N.H. 1986)
(citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807,
815 (N.Y. 1978) (Fuchsberg, J., concurring) (citing Roe, 410 U.S. 113).
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statute that authorizes damages claims for civil-rights violations
committed under color of state law.73 The plaintiffs in these cases
were typically minority women who claimed that they had been
pressured to undergo sterilization procedures by doctors who
believed that they were irresponsible "welfare mothers" who already
had too many children and were a burden on the public fisc. In
some respects, these cases were similar to the miscarriage and
stillbirth cases discussed above, in that both alleged serious, if
intangible, damage to the plaintiffs' reproductive interests at the
hands of negligent and often callous medical professionals. The
sterilization cases, however, differed from the typical miscarriage
case in that the plaintiffs in the sterilization cases also asserted that
the doctors or hospitals had followed a discriminatory policy towards
plaintiffs tied to their race, gender, and class.74 Moreover, such
claims were brought and classified as statutory civil-rights claims
and were frequently pursued by civil-rights organizations or poverty
law centers that had little strategic interest in linking their efforts
to tort suits for negligent infliction of emotional distress, despite
their obvious similarities. 5
Legal scholar Dorothy Roberts has chronicled the sterilization
suits and their significance for the reproductive rights of minority
women. 7 Her history details that, prior to the late 1970s, the
practice of performing unnecessary hysterectomies and tubal
ligations on poor women without their knowledge or consent was
widespread in the North as well as in the Deep South. At the time,
hospitals and doctors used a variety of tactics to coerce consent from
poor pregnant women, from offering tubal ligations to women while
they were in labor to refusing to treat indigent patients unless they
agreed to be sterilized.7
The extent of the sterilization abuses in some states has only
recently been uncovered. Due to research by historian Johanna
73. See Walker v. Pierce, 560 F.2d 609, 611 (4th Cir. 1977); Cox v. Stanton,
529 F.2d 47, 49 (4th Cir. 1975); Madrigal v. Quilligan, D.C. No. CV 75-2057-
JWC (C.D. Cal. 1978), excerpted in DOROTH i A. BROWN, CRTiCAL RACE THEORY:
CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 102-111 (2003); Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F.
Supp. 1196, 1198 (D.D.C. 1974); Kevin Begos & John Railey, Sign This or Else..
.I WINSTON-SALEM J., Dec. 9, 2002, at Al (reporting on the unsuccessful case of
Nial Cox Ramirez) [hereinafter Begos & Railey, Sign This]; John Railey &
Kevin Begos, 'Still Hiding,' WINSTON-SALEM J., Dec. 9, 2002, at Al (reporting on
the unsuccessful case of Elaine Riddick Jessie) [hereinafter Railey & Begos,
Still Hiding].
74. See Walker, 560 F.2d at 610; Cox, 529 F.2d at 49 n.3.
75. See Carlos G. Velez, The Nonconsenting Sterilization of Mexican Women
in Los Angeles, in TWICE A MINORITY: MEXICAN AMERICAN WOMEN 235, 235-48
(Margarita B. Melville ed., 1980) (discussing the trial in Madrigal v. Quilligan).
76. DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND
THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 89-98 (1997).
77. Id. at 91-92.
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Schoen7 8 and investigative reporting by journalists at the Winston-
Salem Journal,79 new details about the cases and procedures of the
North Carolina Eugenics Board have surfaced. In its forty-year
history-which lasted until 1974-the Board authorized the
sterilization of more than 7600 persons. 0 By the late 1960s, over
60% of those sterilized were black women, compared to North
Carolina's population, which was only approximately 25% black."'
Social workers in the state adopted a policy of targeting young,
unmarried black women who had given birth to a child. They
threatened drastic actions, such as sending the teenage women to an
orphanage or cutting off welfare funds to their entire families,
including siblings and parents, if they did not submit to
sterilization. 2 The revelation of the contents of the formerly sealed
records of the Eugenics Board prompted the North Carolina House
of Representatives in 2007 to vote to establish a commission to
determine how to identify and give reparations to the victims,
although no such program has yet been implemented or funded.
3
Two notable civil-rights cases from the 1970s exemplify the
radically different positions courts took toward plaintiffs' claims of
deprivation of reproductive rights and assertions of injury from
coerced sterilizations. One case gained considerable notoriety,
probably because the doctor involved was so explicit about his policy
of pressuring poor black women to undergo sterilization. In Walker
v. Pierce,4 Dr. Clovis Pierce, the attending obstetrician at a county
hospital in South Carolina, admitted that he had a policy of refusing
to treat any woman who was on Medicaid or who was otherwise
unable to pay her bills if she was having a third or subsequent child
78. JOHANNA SCHOEN, CHOICE AND COERCION: BIRTH CONTROL,
STERILIZATION, AND ABORTION IN PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 75-138 (Thadious
M. Davis & Linda K. Kerber eds., 2005).
79. See, e.g., Kevin Begos, Lifting the Curtain on a Shameful Era,
WINSTON-SALEM J., Dec. 8, 2002, at Al [hereinafter Begos, Lifting the Curtain];
Kevin Begos, READ THIS: Records Unexpectedly Available, WINSTON-SALEM J.,
Dec. 8, 2002, at A17; Begos & Railey, Sign This, supra note 73; Danielle Deaver,
Forsyth in the Forefront, WINSTON-SALEM J., Dec. 9, 2002, at Al; John Railey, 'It
Ain't Fair,' WINSTON-SALEM J., Dec. 10, 2002, at Al; John Railey, Just Carrying
Out Orders, WINSTON-SALEM J., Dec. 11, 2002, at A12; John Railey, 'Wicked
Silence,' WINSTON-SALEM J., Dec. 11, 2002, at Al [hereinafter Railey, Wicked
Silence]; John Railey & Kevin Begos, Board Did Its Duty, Quietly, WINSTON-
SALEM J., Dec. 8, 2002, at A17; Railey & Begos, Still Hiding, supra note 73.
80. Begos, Lifting the Curtain, supra note 79.
81. Railey, Wicked Silence, supra note 79.
82. See Begos & Railey, Sign This, supra note 73; Railey & Begos, Still
Hiding, supra note 73.
83. See H.R. 296, 2007 Gen. Assem. (N.C. 2007) (The bill was passed by the
House, but never taken up in the North Carolina Senate. However, the
Speaker of the House has authority to set up the commission.); James Romoser,
Nothing Done on Womble Initiative, WINSTON-SALEM J., Mar. 10, 2008, at Al.
84. 560 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1977).
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and did not agree to be sterilized. 85 As recounted by the dissenting
judge, Dr. Pierce told one patient that it was his "tax money paying
for" the baby and that he was "tired of. .. paying for" 8 6 illegitimate
children. He bluntly said to the patient that if she didn't want to be
sterilized, she could "find... another doctor."87  Pierce was
apparently unashamed of his practice and refused to sign an
affidavit stating that he would not discriminate against Medicaid
patients.88
The two black women who brought the suit in Walker testified
that Pierce used coercive tactics to enforce his policy: he threatened
to have one woman's state assistance terminated if she did not
cooperate and ordered the immediate discharge from the hospital of
another woman just after she gave birth upon her refusal to submit
to a tubal ligation. 9 As could be expected, many women eventually
gave in to the pressure, signed the requisite forms, and submitted to
the sterilization procedure. 90 The evidence indicated that the policy
had an overwhelming negative impact on black women. Of the
eighteen welfare mothers sterilized, seventeen were black. 91
From a torts perspective, Walker looks like a clear case of
coerced consent in the important sense that these women did not
desire to lose their capacity to have children and there was no claim
that the sterilization would somehow benefit their health.
Nevertheless, the majority found no civil-rights violation.92 The
court first characterized the doctor/patient relationship as "one of
free choice for both parties,"9 even though it was clear that indigent
pregnant women, such as the plaintiffs, rarely had alternatives to
medical care besides the county hospital. The court then disputed
both the racial character and the public nature of the doctor's policy,
characterizing it as a "personal economic philosophy" 94 despite the
fact that most welfare children were black and that Medicaid had
paid Pierce over $60,000 during the period in question. 9 For the
majority of the court, the civil-rights statutes posed no obstacle to
the doctor's decision to "establish and pursue the policy he ha[d]
publicly and freely announced."" The majority indicated that the
doctor had every right to maintain his "professional attitude toward
the increase in offspring" and then to set on a course of action to see
85. Id. at 611.
86. Id. at 614 (Butzner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 612 (majority opinion).
89. Id. at 611-12.
90. Id. at 612 n.4.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 613.
93. Id. at 612.
94. Id. at 613.
95. Id. at 612 & n.4.
96. Id. at 613.
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his views "prevail."9" Apparently, the majority considered it
reasonable for a doctor to place only subordinated women (who were
poor, disproportionately minority, and receiving public assistance) to
the Hobson's choice of sterilization if they desired medically
necessary health care.
The lawsuit that had the biggest impact on public policy,
however, was a class action brought by Minnie Lee and Mary Alice
Relf, two black sisters from Montgomery, Alabama, who claimed
that they had been involuntarily sterilized at a federally funded
clinic when they were only fourteen and twelve years old.98 Initiated
by the Southern Poverty Law Center and the National Welfare
Rights Organization, this class action represented over 125,000 class
members consisting of poor, minor, and disabled persons who were
involuntarily sterilized under federally funded programs such as
Medicaid and Aid to Families with Dependent Children.9 Relf v.
Weinberger was brought as a challenge to regulations promulgated
by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") that
had been drafted in response to the nationwide attention given to
the experience of the Relf sisters and the consequent exposure of the
widespread abuses in sterilization procedures.100
In an unusually strong opinion, Judge Gesell of the federal
District Court for the District of Columbia found that an estimated
100,000 to 150,000 low-income persons had been sterilized annually
under the federal programs and that "an indefinite number of poor
people have been improperly coerced into accepting a sterilization
operation under the threat that various federally supported welfare
benefits would be withdrawn unless they submitted to irreversible
sterilization." 1°' He ruled that funding such coercive practices and
tactics violated HEW's authority because it was Congress's intent
that "federally assisted family planning sterilizations are
permissible only with the voluntary, knowing and uncoerced consent
of individuals competent to give such consent.'0 2  As one of the
remedies for the illegal action, Judge Gesell ordered that federal
recipients change their consent procedures to ensure that a patient
had not been subjected to pressure by doctors or others, including
giving the patient a special oral and written assurance that federal
funds could not be withdrawn because of a failure to accept
sterilization. 1
03
Judge Gesell's order and other public-policy initiatives to end
97. Id.
98. Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974), order vacated by
565 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977); B. Drummond Ayres Jr., Sterilizing the Poor:
Exploring Motives and Methods, N.Y. TIMEs, July 8, 1973, at § 4.
99. Relf, 372 F. Supp. at 1198.
100. Id. at 1198.
101. Id. at 1199.
102. Id. at 1201.
103. Id. at 1203.
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sterilization abuse had a significant impact. In 1978, HEW issued
new rules restricting sterilizations performed under programs
receiving federal funds. The rules strengthened the requirements of
informed consent, providing for consent in the preferred language of
the patient and a thirty-day waiting period between the signing of
the consent form and the sterilization procedure. 104 For our
purposes, what is striking about these regulatory reforms is how
closely they implicate issues that are at the heart of tort claims for
negligent infliction of emotional distress in the reproductive context.
The heightened protection against abuse afforded by the HEW
regulations is predicated on the importance of the interest at stake,
which justifies regulating the doctor/patient relationship. Moreover,
the regulations implicitly disavow the Walker court's narrow view of
informed consent by acknowledging that physician pressure and
economic coercion can make a woman's "choice" to accept
sterilization less than free and voluntary. While the ruling in Relf
has no direct application to tort claims, its civil-rights principles
could easily be absorbed to guide courts in tort cases alleging
malpractice and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The take-
home message of Relf is that medical personnel owe patients a
heightened duty of care when advising and treating them on
matters of reproductive choice and health, and that they should
guard against conduct that undermines or injures patients'
interests, whether it results in emotional or physical harm.
In her history of race and reproductive rights, Dorothy Roberts
cautions that the federal regulations have not stopped sterilization
abuse, citing the continued exceptionally high sterilization rates of
black women.'05 However, today's cases are more likely to arise in
individual, rather than class-wide settings, and in what otherwise
appear to be ordinary malpractice and informed-consent suits. It is
unlikely that physicians today would openly acknowledge that they
had unilaterally decided to sterilize a patient because she was
receiving Medicaid and had too many children. Traces of the old
paternalistic and racist attitudes, however, can still be found in the
medical treatment of pregnant minority women and in judicial
responses to their injuries.
One troubling recent case is Robinson v. Cutchin,10 6 a 2001 lack-
of-informed consent case from Maryland involving a pregnant black
woman. In that case, Glenda Robinson was treated by Dr. Cutchin
in connection with the birth of her sixth child. The controversy
centered on whether Robinson had given her consent to a tubal
ligation in the event that she had to undergo a cesarean section. Dr.
Cutchin alleged that she gave such consent, while Robinson denied
it and asserted that she and her husband were planning to have a
104. ROBERTS, supra note 76, at 96-97.
105. Id. at 97.
106. 140 F. Supp. 2d 488 (D. Md. 2001).
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seventh child. 107
As it turned out, it was necessary to perform an emergency C-
section for the delivery of Robinson's baby. Dr. Cutchin then
performed the tubal ligation. According to Robinson, she did not
discover that the sterilization had been performed until nearly two
years after the birth of her child, when she learned she was
incapable of conceiving. 10 Robinson's suit against Dr. Cutchin
alleged several tort claims, including lack of informed consent,
battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.'0 9 Because
the negligence claim of lack of informed consent resulted in a
settlement, the only published opinion in the case involved the
intentional-tort claims for battery and intentional infliction of
emotional distress."10
The opinion of the district court dismissing the intentional-tort
claims displays skepticism toward claims of reproductive injury and
casts doubt on the seriousness of plaintiffs alleged injury.
Reminiscent of Walker's disapproval of black women who choose to
bear multiple children, the district court thought it relevant to point
out that before she was married Robinson had "three prior children
who were born out-of-wedlock" and that she also had three children
with her current husband."' Assuming for the sake of argument
that the tubal ligation had been performed without Robinson's
consent, the court nevertheless concluded that it did not amount to a
battery, defined as a harmful or offensive touching. To the court,
the forced sterilization "was not harmful because it did not cause
any additional physical pain, injury or illness other than that
occasioned by the C-Section procedure." In the court's view, the
sterilization was also not offensive because it purportedly "did not
offend Mrs. Robinson's reasonable sense of personal dignity."
113
Remarkably, the court concluded that the injury to Mrs. Robinson's
reproductive capacity had no connection to dignitary harm or harm
to personal identity: the court bluntly stated that "the fact that she
was not able to have a seventh child after previously giving birth to
six children is hardly something which would offend her reasonable
sense of personal dignity."14  Not surprisingly, given this
assessment of the situation, the court also dismissed the intentional-
infliction claim, concluding that there was no evidence that the
doctor had acted outrageously. "'
Although Robinson's negligence claim survived-and with it,
107. Id. at 490-91.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 490.
110. Robinson, 140 F. Supp. 2d 488.
111. Id. at 491 n.1.
112. Id. at 493.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 494.
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the prospect of recovering damages for emotional distress traceable
to the sterilization procedure-the district court's opinion reveals a
disconcerting tendency to devalue the plaintiffs procreative
interests and to minimize her suffering. The opinion seems
oblivious to the constitutional principle that it is an individual
woman's right to decide whether to bear children and to determine
the size of her family. Particularly given the fact that black women
have historically been denied the right of self-determination in these
matters, the court in Robinson should not have been so quick to
dismiss the plaintiffs distress as unreasonable and to treat her lack
of consent as having nothing to do with her sense of personal
dignity. 116
The miscarriage, stillbirth, and sterilization cases discussed
above provide compelling contexts for heightened protection and for
the imposition of a duty of due care in negligent-infliction cases.
However, the heightened protection for reproductive interests
should not be limited solely to prenatal cases. Even after a child is
born, the connection between the parent and the infant should be
recognized and valued, such that courts should impose a duty of care
upon medical professionals to protect parents against emotional
distress in the important period during and immediately following
childbirth. Thus, there should be little difficulty finding liability for
the mother's distress in the suffocation case, mentioned earlier, in
which the hospital employee brought the one-day-old infant to a
mother for breastfeeding and neglected to notice that the mother
was heavily sedated when she left them alone.'17 Rather than have
courts struggle with whether the mother was a bystander to her
child's death, was in the danger zone, or contemporarily perceived
her child's injury, tort protection should be allowed simply upon a
showing of the defendant's failure to safeguard the plaintiffs
reproductive interests. In real-world terms, the period of
reproduction stretches from conception until the parents take the
baby home from the hospital. During this period, the parents'
special interest deserves heightened protection and warrants finding
a duty to protect against negligent infliction of emotional distress.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I want to mention the obvious: my proposal for
selecting sexual autonomy and reproduction as interests worthy of
triggering a duty of due care under section 46(b) does not stem solely
from the fact that these interests are already accorded considerable
protection in the torts case law and have important implications for
women's equality. It is also because they are fundamental
constitutional interests and represent important norms of liberty
116. Id. at 493.
117. Garcia v. Lawrence Hosp., 773 N.Y.S.2d 59 (App. Div. 2004).
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and equality. Thus, the United States Constitution prohibits
governmental action that interferes with an individual's free choice
of a sexual partner or with important decisions relating to
childbearing and childrearing, absent proof that such interference is
necessary to further a compelling state interest.'18 In constitutional
doctrine, it is the fundamental nature of the personal interests at
stake that trigger the Court's "strict scrutiny." As yet there is no
similar strict scrutiny or condemnation of private activities that
pose equally potent threats to these personal interests.
My proposal also reflects the premise that one of the virtues of
tort law is that it is not a pristine field, but is constantly changing to
absorb concepts, principles, and norms from other areas of law." 9
Several contributions to this Symposium track how tort law has
become intermingled with concepts from more "pure" areas of law,
such as contracts and property. 120 In the post-civil-rights era, there
has also been a migration of constitutional and civil-rights principles
and norms into tort law. 12' There is no good reason why tort law
may borrow from contract, but not constitutional law. Naming
sexual autonomy and reproduction as special interests that trigger a
duty of care in tort law would bring the domain of torts and
constitutional law closer together and provide much needed
protection for liberty and equality in the private realm.
118. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (right of sexual
intimacy); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (parental rights); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (right to contraception); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right
to procreate). See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES & POLICIES §§ 10.1-.4 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing fundamental rights
to marry, custody of children, reproductive autonomy, and sexual activity).
119. See Christopher J. Robinette, Can There Be a Unified Theory of Torts?
A Pluralist Suggestion from History and Doctrine, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 369, 390
(2005).
120. See generally Gregory C. Keating, Is Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress a Freestanding Tort?, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131 (2009) (contract
law); Kenneth W. Simons, The Restatement (Third) of Torts and Traditional
Strict Liability: Robust Rationales, Slender Doctrines, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1355 (2009) (property law).
121. See Chamallas, supra note 5, at 2118. See generally Martha
Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race, Gender, and the
Calculation of Economic Loss, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1435 (2005).
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